Although minor-party candidates have become quite commonplace in modern democratic elections, we know relatively little about the dynamics of voter decision making among minor-party supporters. Does the decision-making process of minor-party supporters differ from the rest of the electorate? What characterizes the individuals who switch support to a major-party candidate from those who remain loyal? Can such switches be attributed to strategic calculations? There exists an extensive literature on strategic voting, primarily in British and Canadian elections, but this research has yet to look at the individual-level dynamics of minor-party support over the course of a campaign. And there is only limited research on the voting calculus of minor-party supporters in the United States, despite the fact that five of the last nine presidential elections included a minor-party candidate who had the potential to change the election outcome. 1 In the 2000 presidential election in the United States, for instance, the vote share of Green party candidate Ralph Nader may very well have made the difference between a win for Republican George Bush or Democrat Al Gore. Nader received nearly 2.9 million votes nationwide in a race where fewer than 500,000 votes separated the two major parties. In the decisive state of Florida, Nader won 97,488 votes where the certified vote count separated Gore and Bush by a mere 537 votes.
Unfortunately, the paucity of available data has previously made it difficult to study the voting calculus of Nader supporters. The 2000 American National Election Study (ANES) includes just thirty-three Nader voters, and other cross-sectional surveys and polls are limited in their ability to explain changes in vote choice. Using a unique panel dataset collected during the 2000 presidential campaign, I explore the individual-level dynamics of Nader support, offering insights into the voter decision-making process of minor-party supporters. I estimate a multinomial logit model to distinguish the characteristics of the individuals who remained loyal to Nader from those who switched support to a major-party candidate. I find that the Nader party supporters most likely to switch support to a major-party candidate were the most politically aware, partisans, those concerned about policy outcomes and respondents in competitive states. Nader supporters were also more likely to abandon Nader at the ballot box rather than earlier in the campaign. Notably, these findings sharply contrast with existing expectations about campaign dynamics and appear to reflect strategic calculations on the part of at least some Nader supporters.
M I N O R -P A R T Y V O T I N G
To vote for a minor-party candidate in the United States is an extraordinary political act. The institutional structures of the American political system have ensured that the Democratic and Republican parties dominate and monopolize political power. 2 The Electoral College makes it difficult for minor-party candidates to win because they might be able to win many votes nationwide, but not win the plurality required in any one state. In 1992, Perot won 19 per cent of the popular vote without gaining a single electoral vote. So, although many minor-party candidates have tossed their hats into the ring, none have come close to winning the White House in well over a century. 3 The presidential campaign also reinforces this two-party structure -major-party candidates have an automatic spot on the ballot in most states, while minor-party candidates face a variety of ballot access restrictions. Many states, for instance, require a petition with signatures equivalent to at least 5 per cent of voters in the previous election. 4 And during the campaign, minor-party supporters are often inundated with messages not to waste their vote. These messages are appeals to minor-party supporters to behave strategically -to vote for their second choice candidate to help prevent their last choice candidate from winning. In other words, these strategic or tactical voters vote for a candidate with a better chance of winning rather than their preferred candidate in order to try to influence the election outcome. 5 Although evidence regarding the extent of strategic voting in the United States and other political systems is mixed, 6 strategic voting is theoretically believed to be one reason, in addition to the above-mentioned institutional barriers, that minor-party candidates have little chance of winning in single-member district plurality systems. 7 There is certainly no scarcity of evidence finding major-party candidates and political leaders trying to persuade minor-party supporters to behave strategically.
Given the forces working against minor-party candidates, we might expect that the decision-making process of minor-party supporters will differ somewhat from the rest of the electorate. Most voting behaviour research, however, has neglected minor-party supporters in their empirical models, 8 so it is unclear whether existing theories of vote choice dynamics apply to minor-party supporters. Vote choice dynamics have typically been attributed to campaign learning; as voters encounter information over the course of the campaign, they are better able to match their predispositions with their candidate choice.
9 As such, individual-level changes in vote choice are thought to reflect partisan activation, reinforcement and solidification. 10 But it seems unlikely that partisan activation can account for surges in minor-party support since so few voters actively identify with a minor party (less than 3 per cent in the Knowledge Networks data that I use here). Existing research has also found that the most politically aware voters are among the least likely to switch support to another candidate because they are best able to make a 'correct' match in the first place.
11 Although Nader supporters have been found to appeal to some of the most highly educated voters, 12 it is unclear whether political sophistication translates into greater loyalty on election day. Recent research suggests that politically sophisticated voters are actually more likely to vote strategically. 13 The literature on third parties has identified a number of other factors related to minor-party voting, including policy issues, major-party candidate dissatisfaction and disenchantment with the political system, but has not yet evaluated whether these factors are related to changes in minor-party support. Who are the minor-party supporters most likely to switch support to a major-party candidate? When are they most likely to abandon the minor-party candidate? And why?
I attempt to answer these questions by using an extensive panel dataset collected by Knowledge Networks (KN) during the 2000 presidential election in the United States. Throughout the campaign, KN repeatedly surveyed 29,000 respondents about their vote intentions.
14 With more than one thousand Nader supporters and several hundred Nader 14 The data were collected as part or all of approximately seventy-five randomly-assigned surveys (with widely varying sample sizes) sampled from the Knowledge Networks panel. The modal number of interviews per respondent is three, and the average number is about five interviews. The dataset is a two-way unbalanced panel voters, adequate data are available to explore the dynamics of Nader support thoroughly. The KN sample consists of a national sample of households recruited by random-digit dialling, who either have been provided internet access through their own computer or are given a WebTV console. 15 Thus, although surveys are conducted over the internet, respondents are a probability sample of the United States' population. 16 By using a methodology that produces a representative sample of the United States' population, KN overcomes the most common failing of previous internet surveys. The viability of the KN methodology was recently demonstrated in an objective comparison test in which a KN sample was found to be comparable to a random digital dial sample in terms of demographics, presidential vote choice and political attitudes.
N A D E R S U P P O R T I N 2000
Various election polls and surveys found that Nader support varied anywhere from 3 to 7 per cent of the candidate vote share through the electoral campaign. In the KN data, I find that roughly 6 per cent of respondents supported Nader in at least one of their interviews. Of particular interest for this article, however, are any changes in candidate support over the course of the campaign.
To get a preliminary look at the temporal dynamics of Nader support, I graph changes in aggregate candidate support from one (two-week) time period to the next in Figure 1 . For example, Gore enjoys a sharp increase of 6.9 percentage points during the period of 15-31 August (corresponding with the Democratic National Convention) relative to his support in the previous period. This overtime mapping of candidate support shows that Nader generally had a positive gain in support over the course of the campaign until election day, when Nader's support declined at the same time that the two major-party candidates enjoyed sharp increases in aggregate support.
While this graph provides evidence of aggregate changes in support over the course of the campaign, it does not offer a picture of the individual-level changes in candidate support. Evidence of change is muted in the aggregate because some people move to the candidate while others simultaneously move away from the candidate. Focusing on individual level dynamics, it becomes apparent that support for Nader, like that for previous minor-party candidates, was far from resolute. A comparison of each individual's final vote choice with earlier campaign support finds that Nader ultimately lost much of his support to major-party candidates at the ballot box. Table 1 compares the extent to which (F'note continued) in that the number of observations are not the same for every respondent and the intervals between observations are not equal. Post-stratification weights are calculated for frequency estimates using age, gender, race, region of resident and metropolitan statistical area from the 2000 Current Population Survey. 15 All telephone numbers have an equal probability of selection, and sampling is done without replacement. More detailed information on the Knowledge Networks methodology can be found on their website, http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/reviewer-info.html. 16 For instance, my sample comes very close to matching the actual election results, deviating from the actual proportion of the vote for Bush, Nader, Gore and Buchanan by 1 percentage point or less -easily within the margin of error. 17 Reflecting the typical nature of third-party support, only 28.3 per cent of those who supported Nader at some point during the campaign ultimately voted for Nader on election day. This compares with 70 per cent of Bush supporters and 68 per cent of Gore supporters remaining loyal to their respective candidates. Similarly, comparing the same respondents from one interview to the next during the campaign finds that an average of 55.7 per cent of Nader supporters remained loyal to Nader the next time interviewed compared to 90 per cent of Bush supporters and 90.8 per cent of Gore supporters remaining loyal to their respective candidates. The Washington Post estimated that more than 5 million would-be Nader voters got cold feet at the last minute, but this suggests that number may very well have been even higher. Before I analyse the 'who, when and why' of changes in Nader support, I first look at the factors that might be related to support for Nader in the first place.
Previous research on minor parties has identified a number of motivations for voting for a third-party candidate. The factors most closely associated with support for a minor party include policy preferences, dissatisfaction with the major-party candidates and disaffection from the government.
19 I offer a brief look at how these factors related to support for Nader in 2000, and then analyse how these considerations influenced the dynamics of Nader support.
First, an individual may be attracted to a minor-party candidate simply because the candidate's policy preferences are more closely aligned with their own than that of either of the two major parties. 20 In the 2000 campaign, Nader emphasized a liberal progressive and anti-corporate campaign message, so we might expect that Nader attracted voters who were ideologically liberal. Yet, comparing self-placement on the seven-point liberalconservative scale, I find that Gore and Nader supporters are nearly identical ideologically. Just slightly more Nader supporters considered themselves to be 'very liberal or liberal' 18 Percentages calculated for respondents included in a post-election survey -roughly 12,000 panel members. Support categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance, an individual who supported both Nader and Gore at some point in the campaign would be counted in both rows. (35 per cent) than did Gore supporters (29 per cent), but the majority of both Nader and Gore supporters self-identified as moderates -54 per cent and 52 per cent, respectively. Moreover, the majority of Nader supporters (52 per cent) were at least 'leaning' Democrats (29 per cent identified as 'strong' or 'weak' Democrats).
Given the association of the Green party with an environmental agenda, it might be expected that Nader support was related more specifically to environmental policy concerns. On average, Nader supporters were slightly more likely to be concerned about the environment than either Gore or Bush supporters. Sixty-nine per cent of Nader supporters were concerned about the environment, compared to 60 per cent of Gore supporters and 37 per cent of Bush supporters. Although in the expected direction, these policy differences hardly suggest that concern for the environment differentiated support for Nader over Gore. By and large, Nader and Gore supporters appear to have quite similar policy concerns.
21 It remains to be seen, however, how these policy concerns relate to changes in Nader support.
In addition to instrumental or policy considerations, previous research has found that minor-party support can be rooted in expressive considerations. Expressive voting contrasts with policy voting in that the value of a vote 'is the value that the voter places on expressing a choice for a, rather than b, in and of itself (i.e., independent of any effect of the voting act on the electoral outcome).' 22 In other words, an individual might be voting a particular way to 'make a statement' rather than achieve a policy or electoral outcome.
One expressive consideration thought to increase minor-party support is a general disaffection from the political system. 23 Individuals who are dissatisfied with the two-party system might support a minor-party candidate to shake up 'politics as usual'. Surprisingly, it was Bush supporters not Nader supporters in 2000 who were more likely to disapprove of both political parties in power. Among Nader voters, 15.3 per cent disapproved of both the Republican Congress and the Democratic White House, compared to 28 per cent of Bush voters (and only 4 per cent of Gore voters). This suggests that voters unhappy with general government performance simply defected to the other major party (as predicted by a retrospective voting model). Nader supporters did, however, appear to be disgruntled with the person in power even though they did not necessarily disapprove of his policy performance. Nader supporters were considerably more unfavourable towards Clinton than were Gore voters -26 per cent of Nader supporters indicated that they were 'very' unfavourable towards Clinton (an additional 20 per cent were 'somewhat' unfavourable), compared to just 4.8 per cent of Gore voters. And just 35 per cent of Nader supporters who voted for Clinton in 1996 now rated him favourably. In other words, job approval and personal favourability/likeability appeared to be distinct concepts in 2000; Nader supporters may have approved of Clinton's job performance, but evaluated him as personally unfavourable.
The other expressive factor thought to increase support for minor-party candidates is dissatisfaction with the candidates offered by the two major parties. Previous research on third-party candidates has found that minor parties win votes when the major parties field 21 Other research has also found that Gore and Nader were 'near substitutes' ideologically (Burden, 'Minor Parties in the 2000 Presidential Election'). 22 uninspiring candidates. 24 Not surprisingly, individuals supporting Nader were more likely than either Bush or Gore supporters to give negative ratings to both Bush and Gore with regards to their leadership abilities. Among Nader supporters, 32 per cent reported that neither major-party candidate would be a good leader, compared to just 5.3 per cent of Bush supporters and 7.2 per cent of Gore supporters. This suggests that support for Ralph Nader in the 2000 election reflected a rejection of the two dominant party candidates but not necessarily a rejection of the policy platforms of the two parties. The next step is to look at how these sources of Nader support relate to an individual's decision to stay with Nader through election day.
To examine the dynamics of Nader support, I want to estimate the effect of the above factors on the probability that a Nader supporter either transitions to Gore, transitions to Bush or remains loyal to Nader. 25 Using the logic of a Markov chain transition model, I calculate the transition probabilities with a multinomial logit model of candidate support (in time t) for individuals who supported Nader in time (t Ϫ 1). 26 The covariates in the model include expressive measures (Clinton unfavourability and Candidate dissatisfaction), policy considerations (Ideology scale and Environmental concerns), Political awareness, Party identification and controls for Age and Gender. Clinton unfavourability is measured before the beginning of the fall campaign with the question, 'Please rate your feelings toward Bill Clinton. Is your overall impression of him favorable, somewhat favorable, neutral, somewhat unfavorable, unfavorable?' Candidate dissatisfaction is an indicator identifying individuals who rated both Bush and Gore negatively with respect to leadership skills ('Does the following phrase apply to Bush (Gore): [Has strong qualities of leadership]'). The environmental concerns variable indicates that an individual gave a pro-environment response to one of several possible questions about the environment. 27 24 Gold, 'Third-party Voting in Presidential Elections'. 25 Analysis is limited to the post-nomination period. 26 For more on Markov chain transition models, see Peter Diggle, Kung-Yee Liang and Scott Zeger, Analysis of Longitudinal Data (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). A common concern with multinomial logit models is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property. Essentially, IIA assumes that the ratio of the probability of choosing one candidate to the probability of selecting another does not change if more candidates enter the campaign, perhaps a tenuous assumption for some voters. Theoretically, one alternative would be to estimate a multinomial probit (MNP), which does not require the IIA assumption. However, MNP has its own set of limitations, including numeric instability and identification problems. With MNP, some elements of the covariance matrix must be constrained in order for the model to be identified -in practice, this leads to limitations on possible dependence between some of the alternatives anyway. Finally, research has found it does not make a difference. See Jay Dow and James Endersby, ' 40 (1996) , 231-60; in this article, Whitten and Palmer argue, p. 225, that 'the IIA assumption … does not cast doubt over the reliability of parameter estimates for assessing the determinants of voting behavior in any particular election'. 27 Specific issue questions differed slightly by survey, and included: (1) 'How about government spending on … [Environment] Do you think the government is spending too much, about right, or too little?' (2) 'Please select 2 or 3 things that have the most to do with deciding who you would like to see become President [Environment] .' (3) 'Using this one to seven scale, how high a priority would you personally want the next Ideology and party identification were measured using the standard questions (the Democratic and Republican measures do not include leaners). Finally, political awareness was measured, in the political profile survey, with the question, 'How interested are you in politics and public affairs?' 28 Also included in the model is an indicator for the election day time period to capture any last minute decline in support for Nader.
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All variables are scaled from zero to one except age. All reported standard errors have been calculated clustering on respondent identifier to account for sample pooling since some respondents were interviewed multiple times. 30 Descriptives on the independent variables are reported in Table 2 Unfortunately, no political knowledge questions were available in the survey. A general interest in politics (notably different from interest in the campaign, which can vary with campaign events) has been found to correlate highly with political knowledge and has often been used in previous research. Finally, I re-estimate the model using instead a measure of newspaper readership frequency and similarly find that the most 'aware' Nader supporters are more likely to switch support to Gore in the next interview and less likely to remain loyal, although the sample size declines and results are not statistically significant at traditional levels. 29 A number of other temporal measures, including weekly/daily counts and period indicator variables, were attempted, but the effects were not statistically significant. 30 Although the sample size is reduced, the conclusions do not change if the sample is restricted to just two interviews per respondent (actual vote and last interview before the election). A variable measuring the length of time between interviews was included but was never statistically significant so was omitted from final models. 31 Among those dissatisfied with the leadership skills of both Bush and Gore, 35 per cent were also strongly unfavourable (and 16 per cent somewhat unfavourable) towards Clinton. The correlation between the two variables is just 0.082.
What characterizes the Nader supporters who switched support to a major-party candidate from those who remained loyal? Table 3 reports the substantive effects from the multinomial logit model. Model coefficients, robust standard errors and model fit statistics for the model are reported Table A1 in the Appendix. The reported values in Table 3 are the change in the predicted probability of remaining loyal to Nader, switching to Bush and switching to Gore for each independent variable as it goes from its minimum to maximum value. 32 In other words, the effects of each factor on the probability that a Nader supporter remains loyal or switches support to another candidate the next time interviewed. For instance, from one interview to the next, female Nader supporters were 11.2 percentage points less likely than males to remain loyal to Nader, 1.0 percentage point more likely to switch from Nader to Bush, and 7.6 percentage points more likely to switch from Nader to Gore. Thus, all else held equal, women were more likely than men to leave Nader for Gore. Although not statistically significant, older Nader supporters (calculated for age 65) were more likely to switch support to another candidate than younger Nader supporters (calculated for age 18). Reported are the changes in predicted probability that a Nader supporter remains loyal (pr(Nader)), switches to Bush (pr(Bush)) or switches to Gore (pr(Gore)) as each predictor variable goes from its minimum to maximum value. *Asterisk indicates that a 90 per cent confidence interval for the estimate does not overlap zero.
Looking at the effect of party identification, we find that partisan activation had a substantial effect on switches from Nader. Democrats were 17 percentage points (and Republicans 16 percentage points) less likely to support Nader in subsequent interviews. Democrats were 18.4 percentage points more likely to switch to Gore, and Republicans were a whopping 27.4 percentage points more likely to switch support to Bush. Republicans accounted for 11 per cent of Nader's supporters during the campaign, but were among the most likely ultimately to leave him. And even though 29 per cent of Nader supporters were Democrats, it seems that many of these Democrats eventually came home to Gore.
Ideology also appears to have a considerable impact on the probability that a Nader supporter remained loyal or not. Nader supporters who classified themselves as 'very conservative' had a predicted probability of remaining loyal to Nader 32.3 percentage points lower than 'very liberal' Nader supporters. 33 Similarly, the 'very conservative' were 27.7 percentage points more likely to switch from Nader to Bush than were the 'very liberal'. In contrast, ideology does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of transitioning to Gore. Regardless of their dissatisfaction with Bush as a candidate, conservatives supporting Nader were especially likely to leave him for the ideologically closer candidate.
Turning to the environmental issue, I find that among those concerned about the environment, the probability of remaining loyal to Nader was 6.9 percentage points lower and the probability of switching to Gore was 11.9 percentage points higher than those not concerned about the environment. Thus, despite the fact that Nader was a candidate for the Green party, Nader supporters concerned about the environment were actually significantly more likely to switch to Gore than to remain loyal to Nader. Prima facie, it might seem irrational for an environmentalist to abandon support of the candidate running on an explicitly environmental platform, but such behaviour is actually consistent with the expectations of strategic voting. In a recent study, Steve Fisher concludes that tactical voters are by definition motivated by short-term instrumental concerns, so the policy consequences of the election outcome must be weighed against the appeal of the minor-party candidate. 34 The role of the expressive variables in the decision making of Nader supporters is quite stark. Both the candidate dissatisfaction and the Clinton unfavourability measures increase the probability of remaining loyal to Nader from one interview to the next. Individuals unfavourable towards Clinton were 9.9 percentage points more likely to remain loyal to Nader and 9.1 percentage points less likely to switch to Gore than those favourable towards Clinton. Interestingly, Nader supporters unfavourable towards Clinton were not significantly more likely to switch support to Bush, again suggesting that attitudes about the person occupying the White House, rather than the policies of the White House, helped to distinguish support for Nader over Gore. Likewise, Nader supporters who rated the leadership skills of both Bush and Gore negatively were 18.3 percentage points more likely to remain loyal to Nader in subsequent interviews. 35 In direct contrast to the expectations of existing theories of campaign dynamics, the most politically aware Nader supporters were actually significantly more likely to transition support to another candidate (especially Gore). The politically aware were 9.5 percentage points less likely to support Nader in subsequent interviews. This effect is consistent with expectations for strategic decision making; the Nader supporters best equipped to understand the logic of a wasted vote are those who are most sophisticated. 36 The election day effect also contrasts with research concluding candidate support tends 33 Roughly 15 per cent of Nader supporters identified themselves as either 'conservative' or 'very conservative'. 34 Fisher, 'Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting'. 35 If the model is estimated with separate variables for Bush's leadership skills and Gore's leadership skills as well as an interaction of the two, I again find that the joint effect is to increase the probability of remaining loyal to Nader. The single combined measure, however, allows us to compare the effect of those who think poorly of both Bush and Gore relative to those who might think poorly of just one or the other. 36 Duch and Palmer, 'Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?' to solidify as the election approaches. 37 All things held constant, Nader supporters are more likely to switch to a major-party candidate at the ballot box rather than earlier in the campaign. This again highlights the lack of connection between support for Nader during the campaign compared to an actual vote for Nader on election day, and is again suggestive of possible strategic behaviour on the part of some Nader supporters.
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOUR AND NADER DYNAMICS
The findings thus far have identified who was most likely to switch support from Nader to a major-party candidate. Although the patterns are consistent with strategic voting, they are far from definitive. We must be cautious in attributing motivation to an observed behaviour. On the one hand, Nader supporters were certainly inundated with messages not to waste their votes; Democrats proclaimed that a 'vote for Nader is a vote for Bush'. A number of liberal interest groups, including the Sierra Club and the League of Conservation Voters, spent millions of dollars on last minute anti-Nader advertisements. Members of Congress who had previously supported Nader causes sent an open letter to Nader, 'The prospect of waking up on November 8 to a Bush presidency is too dangerous for too many … . Ralph, do not let your candidacy be the reason for that to happen. Ask your supporters in swing states to vote for Al Gore.' 38 Given the number and pattern of observed switches, these appeals may very well have been effective. On the other hand, we have not ruled out the possibility that the observed transitions reflect sincere behaviour -Nader supporters learning that one of the major-party candidates was a better match for their preferences.
Researchers have turned to a variety of different techniques for trying to identify strategic behaviour, each with its own set of benefits and limitations.
39 Some research has relied on aggregated electoral data to identify patterns consistent with individual-level strategic behaviour. 40 Other research has treated thermometer ratings (or other favourability scales) as a measure of sincere preferences and compared these 'sincere preferences' to the reported vote. 41 Still others rely on residuals from empirical models to infer strategic behaviour. 42 In a recent analysis, Fisher offers criticism of each of these approaches, suggesting that tactical voting should instead be measured directly by asking about voting motivations. 43 Although this approach also has its sceptics, perhaps the biggest limitation is simply that the appropriate survey questions are very rarely available. 44 Here as well, I will try to distinguish between sincere and strategic behaviour indirectly, looking for as many clues as possible with the available data. I first evaluate whether changes in Nader support are related to the closeness of the race between Bush and Gore. Previous research has suggested that voters are more likely to behave strategically if the race is close between the major-party contenders because the voter has a greater chance of being decisive between one's second and third choices. 45 This logic was made quite clear by the vote trading websites that emerged during the 2000 campaign. 46 In battleground states, then, Nader supporters should recognize that they have a greater likelihood of being decisive, while Nader supporters in safe states should recognize they have a much smaller chance of influencing their state's Electoral College vote. In Texas, for instance, Nader supporters could hold out little hope that switching their vote to Gore could have made a difference to the outcome.
To test this hypothesis empirically, I first add a measure of competitiveness to the empirical model. Because the classification of a state as a 'battleground' state varied somewhat by source and timing during the campaign, I include an indicator if the state was a solid 'safe' state. 47 In states that were unmistakably projected to go to either Bush or Gore, Nader supporters had no incentive to behave strategically and we should therefore observe higher loyalty rates from one interview to the next. Table 4 reports the results adding the competitiveness measure to the model. The coefficients, robust standard errors (clustered by subject), and model fit statistics for this model are reported in the Appendix. The effect of the other factors does not change, and we find that Nader supporters in safe states were significantly more loyal than Nader supporters in unsafe states. Holding all else constant, Nader supporters in safe states were 7.3 percentage points more likely to remain loyal to Nader in subsequent interviews, and 5.5 percentage points less likely to switch support to Gore.
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Beyond this additive effect of state-level competitiveness, however, we might also expect the effect of the other covariates to be conditional on state competitiveness. Most obviously, Democrats and Republicans might be more likely to remain loyal to Nader in safe states than in competitive states; in other words, the impact of party identification might be conditional on the closeness of the race in the state. Table 5 reports the effect of the covariates for respondents in safe states compared to competitive states. 49 Again, reported are the changes in the predicted probability of switching to Gore, switching to Bush or remaining loyal to Nader for each variable across its range of values. We see, for 45 Blais and Nadeau, 'Measuring Strategic Voting'; Duch and Palmer, 'Strategic Voting in Post-Communist Democracy?' 46 Before shutting themselves down in response to lawsuit threats by California's Secretary of State, www.nadertrader.org and www.voteswap2000.org matched the email addresses of Nader supporters in competitive states with Gore supporters in safe states, so they could co-ordinate switching votes. It was anattempt to help Nader make 5 per cent of the vote in order to receive federal funding, while helping Gore supporters have their vote cast where it matters most, the swing states. 47 States were coded safe if the state was never designated a battleground state in 2000 (as categorized bycnn.com) and the winner's margin of victory in 1996 exceeded 5 per cent. By this standard, the following states were deemed uncompetitive: Alaska, Alabama, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Maryland, Mississippi, North Dakota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Wyoming. 48 Results do not change if robust standard errors are instead clustered on state of respondent. 49 Asterisk indicates effects that changes in predicted probabilities are statistically different from zero (90 per cent confidence interval calculated using CLARIFY software). Reported are the changes in predicted probability that a Nader supporter remains loyal (pr(Nader)), switches to Bush (pr(Bush)) or switches to Gore (pr(Gore)) as each predictor variable goes from its minimum to maximum value. *Asterisk indicates that a 90 per cent confidence interval for the estimate does not overlap zero. Reported are the changes in predicted probability that a Nader supporter remains loyal (pr(Nader)), switches to Bush (pr(Bush)) or switches to Gore (pr(Gore)) as each predictor variable goes from its minimum to maximum value. *Asterisk indicates that a 90 per cent confidence interval for the estimate does not overlap zero. Bold values are effects that are statistically larger in competiive states than in uncompetitive states.
instance, that women were 3 percentage points less likely than men to remain loyal to Nader in safe states, but were 22.3 percentage points less likely than men to support Nader in battleground states. Party identification is always related to declining loyalty to Nader, but the effect is nearly double in competitive states. In safe states, Democrats are 13.1 percentage points less likely (10.5 percentage points less likely for Republicans) than
Fig. 2. Predicted effects of party identification and state competitiveness on probability of Nader supporters switching candidate preference
Independents to remain loyal to Nader, compared with a 23.6 per cent difference (19.1 per cent difference for Republicans) in potentially competitive states.
To illustrate the differences in predictions by party identification and state competitiveness better, Figure 2 graphs the effects for Independents, Democrats and Republicans in both safe and competitive states. In the first bar, we see that Independent Nader supporters in safe states have a 72.9 per cent likelihood of remaining loyal to Nader in their next interview, a 23.3 per cent probability of switching support to Gore, and just a 4.0 per cent probability of switching support to Bush. In contrast, Independents in competitive states have just a 60.4 per cent predicted probability of being loyal, and a 12.3 per cent change of switching to Bush and a 27.3 per cent change of switching to Gore. For all respondents the likelihood of remaining loyal to Nader from one interview to the next declines significantly in competitive states relative to safe states. The declines are particularly pronounced, however, for partisans. The differences in predicted probabilities are so large, in fact, that we would actually predict both Democrats and Republicans to remain loyal to Nader in safe states, but to switch to their respective party candidates in competitive states. Republicans decline from a 65.5 per cent probability of supporting Nader in safe states to a 38 per cent probability of supporting Nader in competitive states. Similarly, Democrats have a 59 per cent probability of remaining loyal to Nader in safe states, but only a 35.8 per cent probability of supporting Nader in competitive states. The ability of the Democratic and Republican parties to bring home partisan Nader supporters is clearly related to the competitive electoral context.
It is especially telling that the effect of political awareness on the probability of switching is also greater in competitive states than in uncompetitive states. 50 In safe states, there is no statistical difference between the politically aware and unaware in their loyalty to Nader, but there is a large and significant difference between their loyalty rates in competitive states. Politically sophisticated Nader supporters appear to be reacting to the competitive environment, as predicted by previous research on strategic voting. 51 The results also indicate that ideologues and environmentalists -the apparent policy-driven voters -were more likely to switch support to a major-party candidate in competitive states than in safe states. Again, a finding that makes sense if these voters are behaving strategically. Finally, the results indicate that the election day period effect is not statistically significant in safe states, but is quite substantial in competitive states. In other words, the timing of the campaign has no impact in safe states, but Nader supporters in competitive states are significantly less likely to remain loyal to Nader at the ballot box compared to earlier in the campaign. Together, these findings offer a rather compelling interpretation of the observed dynamics as reflecting strategic behaviour.
Also striking are the effects of candidate dissatisfaction and Clinton unfavourability in battleground states. Nader supporters who disliked both Bush and Gore were 25.6 percentage points more likely to remain loyal to Nader and 19.5 percentage points less likely to switch to Gore in battleground states. Nader supporters who disliked Clinton were 15.8 percentage points more likely to remain loyal and 16.4 percentage points less likely to switch support to Gore. Even accounting for strategic behaviour then, it appears that the decision-making process of Nader supporters was shaped by attitudes towards political figures besides Nader himself. The Clinton unfavourability effect also confirms the conclusions of earlier research on the 2000 election that found negative attitudes towards Clinton damaged Gore's electoral chances.
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Although the findings here suggest many Nader supporters behaved strategically in 2000, an alternative hypothesis is that Nader supporters in competitive states encounter more information about all the candidates, and so might realize that they sincerely prefer Bush or Gore. However, a separate descriptive analysis finds that the Nader supporters who switched to a major-party candidate at the ballot box were also more likely to indicate that they were voting against another candidate. When asked their motivation for voting for Gore, 30 per cent of previous Nader supporters reported that they were 'voting against another candidate', while just 13 per cent of consistent Gore supporters offered the same motivation. Among Bush voters, 28 per cent of previous Nader supporters reported they were 'voting against' another candidate, compared to just 13 per cent of consistent Bush supporters. 53 Likewise, 41 per cent of Gore voters who supported Nader in their previous interview indicated that they did not think Gore held strong leadership abilities, compared to just 14 per cent of constant Gore supporters. And 36 per cent of previous Nader 50 Although not reported in the table, an additional interaction between political awareness and party identification finds that the most politically aware partisans were particularly likely to switch support to their party's candidate. Politically aware Democrats were 6.8 percentage points more likely than unaware Democrats to switch support to Gore, and politically aware Republicans were a whopping 39 percentage points more likely than unaware Republicans to switch support to Bush. 53 Other response categories were party identification, issues, qualifications, vice-presidential candidate and other. It should be noted that a respondent could have selected 'issues' as a motivation for voting for Bush or Gore, and still behaved strategically. supporters who voted for Bush in the ballot box reported that Bush did not hold strong leadership qualities, compared to just 8 per cent of Bush voters who supported Bush in a previous interview. This again suggests a decision-making process in which Nader supporters 'held their nose' to vote for a major-party candidate in an effort to prevent their third-choice candidate from winning.
To rule out the possibility that the differences between states reflect an informational difference across states (i.e., that respondents in battleground states simply had more information (pro and con) about Nader), I also take into account Nader's campaigning strategy. 54 Although the major-party candidates concentrated their efforts in battleground states, recent research has found that Nader did not in fact follow a battleground campaigning strategy. 55 If all candidates campaigned only in states that were competitive, we would not be able to differentiate the effect of campaign information from the effect of the competitive context. Since Nader did not campaign in all competitive states, we can look at comparisons of loyalty rates by state competitiveness while roughly controlling for levels of information about the candidates. Looking only at those states in which Nader did not hold a campaign appearance still finds higher loyalty rates in uncompetitive states than in competitive states. 56 In the states in which Nader did not campaign, 62.9 per cent of Nader supporters in safe states were loyal compared to just 52.6 per cent in competitive states.
Using a unique repeated measures dataset, I examine the individual-level dynamics of Nader support in the 2000 presidential election in the United States. I find that the Nader supporters most likely to switch support to a major-party candidate were party identifiers, ideologues, those concerned about the environment, and the politically sophisticated. The most loyal Nader supporters were those who were unfavourable towards Clinton and those who thought both Bush and Gore lacked leadership skills.
This analysis offers two important corrections to existing theories of vote choice dynamics. First, although previous research suggests candidate support will solidify during a campaign, Nader supporters were more likely to abandon Nader on election day than earlier in the campaign. Secondly, in direct contrast to the expectations of Zaller and Converse, politically aware Nader supporters were less likely to remain loyal from one interview to the next. The analysis here suggests that existing theories of campaign dynamics do not accurately predict the behaviour of minor-party supporters because they do not account for strategic calculations. By all indications, many Nader supporters switched support to a major-party candidate in an effort to try to prevent their third choice candidate from winning.
Particularly notable is that Nader supporters concerned about the environment were more likely to switch support to Gore even though Nader was running on the Green party ticket. Since instrumental voters are concerned about electoral and policy outcomes, they should be more likely to take a candidate's chances of winning into account in their decision-making process. So, instrumental voters supporting a minor-party candidate should be more likely ultimately to switch to their second choice candidate if their first choice candidate has no shot at winning. 57 Indeed, the analysis finds that policy considerations are more strongly related to Nader defections in competitive states than uncompetitive states.
In contrast, those supporting Nader for expressive reasons were undeterred by the wasted vote appeal, and were the most likely to remain loyal. These voters might not be voting so as to alter the outcome but instead to send a message or signal. 58 For these Nader supporters, they might consider their vote to be much like cheering for their favourite team in the stadium. If a voter views the vote as an end in itself, then there is little reason to respond strategically to the electoral environment.
This analysis takes us one step closer to understanding not just the reason that individuals support minor-party candidates, but also when and why they decide to abandon support of those candidates. The findings also highlight the challenges facing minor-party candidates -they have to work harder to attract supporters and they have to work harder to retain them. Interestingly, while previous third-party research has found that minor-party candidates can attract voters who share their stance on particular issues, the research here finds that those same supporters might also be among the most likely ultimately to abandon the candidate. Minor-party candidates will instead find their most loyal supporters among the disenchanted, disgruntled and disaffected. To be sure, this suggests a somewhat disturbing optimal campaign strategy for minor-party candidates. It appears to be more effective for minor-party candidates to campaign against the other candidates and against the political system than to run on the basis of their own platform and policy positions.
Another contribution of this analysis is that it highlights the consequences of ignoring minor-party supporters in political science theories of campaign dynamics and empirical models of voting behaviour. In recognizing the possible strategic calculations of minor-party supporters, for instance, we come to very different predictions about who is likely to change their vote choice during a campaign. Finally, taking into account the distinct decision-making process of minor-party candidates will also help us in understanding the ebbs and flows of the broader electoral campaign. 57 Fisher, 'Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting'. 58 
